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The Hydra
by Carl E. Schneider

A

lmost nobody favors long
consent forms for prospective research subjects. Almost
everybody thinks they interfere with
informed consent's purpose-good decisions. Nevertheless, almost everybody
believes consent forms have long been
getting longer.
Years ago, Paul Appelbaum lamented
the "tendency to cram ever more information into consent forms." 1 Weeks
ago, Ilene Albala and her colleagues
(one of them Appelbaum) reported in
IRE: Ethics & Human Research that the
length of one institutional review board's
forms "increased roughly linearly by an
average of 1. 5 pages per decade. In the
1970s, the average consent form was
less than one page long and often only a
paragraph or two, but by the mid-1990s
the average form had increased in length
to over 4.5 pages." Similarly, "Baker
and Taub demonstrated that the mean
length of consent forms nearly doubled
between 1975 and 1982. More recently,
Beardsley and colleagues in Australia
found that the median length of consent forms increased from seven to 11
pages between 2000 and 2005." 2
Long forms are deplored on several grounds: That people will not read
them. That even if people read them,
they would not understand them. That
even if people understood them, the
forms would not promote better and
might promote worse decisions.
For example, in a study of principal investigators, over half thought
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contemporary consent forms "unlikely
to be read" or "incomprehensible."
Onerous length and detail that reduced subjects' understanding were bemoaned. One researcher thought "most
subjects skim through the incredibly
long informed consents, believing that
most of it is simply bureaucracy."
These concerns are well founded.
First, long forms repel, confuse, bore,
and distract. (It appears "that, in an
educational context, people are unlikely
to read entire documents that contain
more than 1000 words, or about 4 pages."3) Furthermore, these forms compete for your attention with hundreds
of other disclosures about innumerable
matters. Who could-who wouldstudy them all? Who reads credit card
contracts, mortgage agreements, retirement account prospectuses, bank
privacy statements, online purchase
conditions, HIPAA warnings, insurance
provisions, or rental car forms? 4 Not I.
Not you. So, for example, the patients
HIPAA blesses do "not appear to recognize, understand, or care about this
complex law as it applies to research."
They ask about disclosures "exceedingly
rarely. For example, one academic health
center reported that between 2003 and
2007, the institution received only 23
requests for accounting of disclosures,
and none were from research." 5
Second, in both research and clinical
medicine even good forms and processes fail to achieve their educational goals.
Even tested after optimal "consenting,"

patients correctly answer only a third to
a half of the questions asked. 6 And even
patients with "a relatively large variety
of information sources" use incorrect
information, so that fewer than half the
breast cancer patients in one study understood treatments' survival rates, and
fewer than a fifth understood recurrence
rates? The causes are many. For example, illiteracy and innumeracy prevent
many people from reading many forms.
(Roughly ninety percent of the people
in one study had at least some college
education, but 40 percent "could not
solve a basic probability problem or
convert a percentage to a proportion. "8)
Yet the simpler your language, the more
words you need to explain your ideas,
and the longer forms get.
Third, people can keep only a few
things in mind when analyzing a problem. Miller's "magical number seven"
is the classic estimate, and it is easily
exceeded. For example, Miranda warnings are familiar, few, and short. Yet
even with "verbal chunking" (combining data for easier storage) "the upper
limit of information processing for
Miranda warnings is likely less than
75 words," 9 considerably fewer, that is,
than the usual Miranda warning. And
when anesthesiologists and nurse practitioners tried to educate their patients,
they "vastly exceeded patients' shortterm memory capacity." 1° Furthermore,
integrating "different types of information and values into a decision is a very
difficult cognitive process." Indeed, information can decrease the reliability of
decisions. For example, the "reliability
of the choices [of horse-racing handicappers] decreased as more information
was made available." 11
If long forms are widely and rightly
condemned, why do they keep getting
longer and wronger? Each form must
be individually approved by a regulatory agency-an IRB. This gives IRBs
a degree of authority over disclosure few
regulators can match. So if things are
going wrong, IRBs are the first place to
look for a cause.
A study by William Burman (and
others) provides a striking picture of
how IRBs affect consent forms. 12 That
study "evaluated the local review process
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of two protocols from a multicenter
clinical trials group." The twenty-five
sites included "academic medical centers, Veteran's Administration Medical
Centers, and public health departments
chosen in large part for their experience
in clinical research" and thus included
"IRBs that are likely to be representative oflarge institutions oriented toward
clinical research." IRB "review was a
time-consuming process, requiring a
median of 30 [range 10-48] hours of
work by the local study site and more
than 3 months of calendar time to
complete." The IRBs did not require
changes in the protocols, but they required a median of 46.5 changes in each
consent form (range 3-160). (Only 1.5
percent of the changes "were thought
to represent a need to fit specific local
conditions.")
Most (85 percent) of the changes
"did not change the meaning of the
consent form," but they did change its
quality. The forms got longer, the sentences got wordier, the active voice got
scarcer, and the reading-difficulty level
got higher (by a mean of 0.9 levels), so
that 41 percent of the forms "had an inappropriately high reading grade level."
Furthermore, eleven percent of the
changes actually introduced errors into
the forms. Two-thirds of the forms "had
an error of protocol presentation or a
required consent form element." Many
errors were minor, but over a quarter
"were more substantive: deletions of significant side effects (e.g., the possibility
of hepatotoxicity from rifampin and/or
pyrazinamide), major errors in the description of study procedures (e.g., incorrect information on study duration),
or the complete removal of a required
section of the consent form (e.g., the
right to withdraw from the study)."
If this is how IRBs review consent
forms, no wonder an old IRB hand like
Robert Levine thinks "there is no more
expensive or less competent redaction
service available in the United States
than that provided by an alarmingly
large number ofiRBs." 13 But IRB members surely share the preference for concise consent forms. When a regulatory
agency produces results neither it nor
anyone else likes, there are deep-seated

reasons. We will consider three: the
federal regulations, the IRB incentive
structure, and the IRB system's goals.
First, Appelbaum long ago cited
"HHS Regulations . . . requiring that
ever-increasing amounts of information be presented to potential research
subjects." 14 Certainly they demand copious disclosures and invite IRBs to require more. Second, Vesuvian disclosure
seems to protect IRBs and their institutions against lawsuits and Office for Human Research Protections retribution.
Third, such disclosure seems to serve
the IRB system's goals. The Albala study
found that "discrepancies in the descriptions of risks between the consent form
and the protocol" declined as forms'
length increased. This might suggest
that forms got longer because subjects
needed more information. However, although these discrepancies "had ceased
before the end of our study window,
page length continued to increase, suggesting that greater attention to risks has
not been the sole factor responsible for
the increase in page length."
The IRB system's goal is not just reporting risks described in a protocol. It
is, as Appelbaum said, "full disclosure."
This is an ever-expanding category,
since new topics (like conflicts of interest) and new risks (especially social, psychological, and "dignitary'' risks) keep
proliferating. And the goal is not just
"full disclosure," but, as then-Secretary
of Health and Human Services Donna
Shalala announced, "maximal protection for all human subjects." Maximal
means error free, since "even one lapse
is too many." So in a 2,400-word article, Shalala used "ensure" nine times,
"guarantee" twice, and "make sure"
twice. The system must "guarantee" the
"greatest possible protection for every
human subject, in every clinical trial
and at every research institution in the
country." 15
How are these utopian ambitions
to be met? No doubt by yet more meticulous forms, but also, the Institute of
Medicine "urge[s, by] a new approach
to informed consent, one in which legal disclaimer and institutional selfprotection are second to clear, simple,
unclouded, unhurried, and sensitive

disclosure that gives the potential participant all the information a reasonable
person would need to make a wellinformed decision, and the time to do
so." So "consent should be an ongoing
process that focuses not on a written
form or a static disclosure event, but
rather on a series of dynamic conversations between the participant and the
research staff that should begin before
enrollment and be reinforced during
each encounter or intervention." 16 And
so an ever-more elaborate form becomes
embedded in an ever-more elaborate
process.
But the giantism of consent forms is
not just a product of the American IRB
system. It is an international phenomenon. And it afflicts hundreds of other
kinds of legally mandated disclosures.
For example, the Truth in Lending
Act of 1968 required lenders disclose
interest rates and fees. Simple enough,
perhaps, but soon the Federal Reserve
issued Regulation Z to instruct creditors. That regulation, "while it did not
salvage Truth-In-Lending's basic goals,
did succeed in making the statute too
complex to be complied with." 17
Giantism-in short-is inherent in
conventional disclosure mandates like
informed consent. They aspire to equip
novices to make well-informed decisions
about complex questions. Yet while less
may be more, less is not enough. For
the reasons we've canvassed, lengthy
disclosures are self-defeating, but shorter forms omit relevant facts. If there is
a via media between too much and too
little, it is elusive.
Even if that via media could be
found, the institutional dynamics of
mandating disclosure-like the fear of
legal liability, the threat of political criticism, and ideological zeal-impel regulators past moderation into excess. Long
and ever-longer consent forms (and
processes) we shall have always with us
until we ask more basic questions about
these mandates than we have dared face.
Until then, prospective research subjects
will be told much and learn little.
1. P.S. Appelbaum, "Informed Consent:
Always Full Disclosure?" in J.E. Sieber, NIH
Readings on the Protection of Human Subjects in Behavioral and Social Science Research:
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